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INTRODUCTION 
“Shit, piss, cunt, fuck, cocksucker, motherfucker and tits:” the 
seven dirty words that comedian George Carlin observed “you 
couldn’t say on the public, ah, airwaves, um, the ones you definitely 
wouldn’t say, ever.”1  Mr. Carlin may have been mistaken because the 
Second Circuit recently gave broadcasters a victory in their battle 
against broadcast indecency regulation.  This Note analyzes the 
validity of the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC” or 
“Commission”) indecency regulations—specifically of fleeting 
expletives—in light of the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Fox 
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC.2  In Fox Television, the court held that 
the FCC’s inclusion of fleeting expletives in the category of actionably 
indecent speech was an arbitrary and capricious departure from 
precedent.3 
Although the Second Circuit ruled against the FCC, this Note 
argues that fleeting expletives are constitutionally sanctionable under 
current law and that the FCC was not acting arbitrarily in expanding 
fining to single broadcast occurrences of indecent words.  This Note 
also addresses and distinguishes the broader criticisms of broadcast 
indecency regulation, concluding that, although the constitutional 
justifications for regulation are eroding, the fleeting expletive policy 
is not the proper basis for reevaluating the FCC’s regulatory function. 
Part I of this Note surveys the legal limitations on the FCC’s 
authority to regulate indecent material.  Part II describes the specific 
                                                 
 1. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 751 (1978) (quoting GEORGE CARLIN, 
Filthy Words, on OCCUPATION:  FOOLE! (Eardrum Records 1973)). 
 2. 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 3. Id. at 462. 
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broadcasts and Commission rulings leading up to the Fox Television 
case.  Parts III and IV analyze the Fox Television court’s disposition of 
the case under arbitrary and capricious review, both in light of the 
analogous 1988 case of Action For Children’s Television v. FCC,4 and 
generally applicable bases for judicial reversal of agency action.  
These Parts argue that the policy change was not arbitrary and 
capricious because it was adequately reasoned and consistent with the 
FCC’s authority.  Further, Parts III and IV suggest that the Fox 
Television court’s criticisms were not directed at the reasoning behind 
the policy change, but at the broadcast indecency regulatory scheme 
generally. 
Part V examines the Fox Television court’s prediction, in dicta, that 
the FCC’s indecency definition will be found unconstitutional.  This 
Part concludes that the inclusion of fleeting expletives is 
constitutional under current law, falling squarely within the Supreme 
Court’s approval of context-based broadcast speech restrictions.  
Finally, this Note concludes that the Court should not use the Fox 
Television case to revisit the broader justifications for regulation of 
broadcast but should instead wait for a case that raises more 
persuasive and timely arguments against the FCC’s continued 
regulatory role. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The FCC’s Statutory Authority 
The FCC was established by the Communications Act of 19345 as a 
regulatory agency for commerce in radio and wire communications.6  
From its inception, the FCC has been explicitly prohibited from 
engaging in any censorship activity of the public airwaves.7  At the 
same time, however, the FCC and broadcasters have been categorized 
as “public trustees”8 charged with providing programming in the 
                                                 
 4. 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 5. Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–
613 (2000)). 
 6. See id. (indicating that this measure would serve as a regulatory framework for 
the communications industry). 
 7. See 47 U.S.C. § 326 (2000) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or 
construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio 
communications or . . . interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio 
communication.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Inevitable Wasteland:  Why the Public 
Trustee Model of Broadcast Television Regulation Must Fail, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2101, 2103, 
2105–08 (1997) (arguing that the FCC’s broadcast regulation schemes designed to 
enforce broadcaster’s public interest obligations are constitutional but ineffective).  
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public interest.9  One aspect of the public trustee model has been 
regulation of speech deemed inappropriate for the viewing public, 
most notably child viewers.10  In carrying out this duty of policing 
speech, the FCC has relied on the public trustee doctrine,11 federal 
criminal law prohibiting the broadcast of indecent, profane, or 
obscene material,12 and authorization to enforce that federal law 
through forfeiture penalties issued to broadcast licensees.13 
B. First Amendment Conflict 
The Supreme Court has held that speech that qualifies as obscene 
may permissibly be regulated in broadcast and other contexts.14  
Merely indecent speech (the category in which fleeting expletives 
                                                 
The essential justification for the limited First Amendment protection of broadcast—
and the FCC’s resulting power to regulate—was outlined in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. 
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).  There, the Court held that the “scarcity of broadcast,” 
(i.e., the fact that “there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast 
than there are frequencies to allocate”) justified government regulation.  Id. at 388, 
400–01. 
 9. See 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (2000) (providing that the FCC shall “generally 
encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest”).  
Additional contentious examples of public interest obligations are the fairness 
doctrine and the obligation to provide children with quality educational 
programming while protecting them from inappropriate content.  See Anthony E. 
Varona, Out of Thin Air:  Using First Amendment Public Forum Analysis to Redeem American 
Broadcasting Regulation, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 149, 159–65 (2006) (discussing the 
fairness doctrine and suggesting that educational programming obligations are not 
sufficiently defined or enforced).  The FCC abolished the fairness doctrine in 1987.  
See Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (approving the 
FCC’s abolition of fairness doctrine as neither arbitrary nor capricious). 
 10. See Anthony E. Varona, Changing Channels and Bridging Divides:  The Failure 
and Redemption of American Broadcast Television Regulation, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 
39–40 (2004) (recounting the FCC’s “strikingly permissive enforcement attitude” in 
enforcing indecency and obscenity prior to the Commission decisions at issue in Fox 
Television). 
 11. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 383 (approving classification of broadcast 
frequencies as part of the “public trust”). 
 12. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000) (“Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or 
profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”). 
 13. See 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(D) (2000) (making violators of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 
liable to the U.S. government in forfeiture penalties).  This provision is how the FCC 
is technically authorized to administratively impose fines, revoke licenses, and issue 
warnings for violations of its indecency regulations.  See Sharokh Sheik, Comment, 
FCC Indecency Violations:  Should the FCC Be Able to Fine Non-Broadcast Licensees for 
Indecency Violations?, 35 SW. U. L. REV. 457, 462 (2006) (noting that, although § 1464 
is a criminal statute, “it has never been applied literally” and has instead been 
enforced through civil fines). 
 14. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973) (reaffirming that the First 
Amendment does not protect obscene material).  The definition of obscenity at issue 
in Miller was essentially material that “taken as a whole” appeals to the “prurient 
interest.”  Id. at 37 n.1 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  The quintessential example of 
obscenity, although only a “sub-group of all ‘obscene’ expression,” is pornography.  
Id. at 20 n.2 (majority opinion). 
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fall), however, is fully protected by the First Amendment outside of 
the broadcast context.15  An inherent conflict therefore exists 
between the FCC’s goal of regulating broadcasters as public trustees 
and the First Amendment16 limitation on what speech the 
government may permissibly regulate.17  Regulation of indecent 
speech is a problematic area18 where the FCC treads a fine line 
between impermissible censorship and protecting the public 
interest.19  Adding to the complexity is the pressure felt by the FCC 
from the broadcast industry it regulates, Congress, and the public.20   
                                                 
 15. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (holding that display of 
the word “fuck” in a public space is protected by the First Amendment). 
 16. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”). 
 17. See, e.g., Krotoszynski, supra note 8, at 2123 (noting that the First Amendment 
is at odds with the FCC’s duty to require broadcasters to fulfill their obligations as 
public trustees but concluding that regulation of broadcast speech is likely 
constitutional); see also Robert Corn-Revere, Can Broadcast Indecency Regulations Be 
Extended to Cable Television and Satellite Radio?, 30 S. ILL. U. L.J. 243, 249–71 (2006) 
(surveying attempts to regulate non-broadcast media such as cable and Internet and 
predicting that any future attempts “would be almost certain to fail a constitutional 
challenge”). 
 18. Even the FCC has acknowledged that the First Amendment’s protection of 
indecent speech requires the government to “both identify a compelling interest for 
any regulation it may impose on indecent speech and choose the least restrictive 
means to further that interest,” which is the standard articulation of constitutional 
strict scrutiny.  Industry Guidance on Commission’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency (2001 Enforcement 
Policies), 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, 8000 (2001) (internal quotations omitted). 
 19. The problem actually concerns the potential self-censorship that results from 
the threat of fines rather than literal government censorship of speech, as the FCC 
does not actually prohibit indecent speech, but rather, levies fines after the fact.  See, 
e.g., Noelle Coates, Note, The Fear Factor:  How FCC Fines are Chilling Free Speech, 14 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 775, 780–82 (2005) (highlighting the danger that broadcasters, 
through self-censorship, will become “the functional equivalent of a government 
censor”).  See generally Sheik, supra note 13, at 463 (describing the FCC’s indecency 
complaint enforcement process). 
 20. The public is overwhelmingly represented by a select few activist groups who 
file the majority of complaints.  See Geoffrey Rosenblat, Stern Penalties:  How the Federal 
Communications Commission and Congress Look To Crack Down on Indecent Broadcasting, 
13 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 167, 173–75 (2006) (noting that FCC enforcement 
procedures allow “watchdogs, activist groups and individuals” to target certain 
broadcasters).  This calls into question how representative the complaint process is of 
public opinion.  See Coates, supra note 19, at 789 (noting the influence of interest 
groups on the regulatory process); see also B. Chad Bungard, Indecent Exposure:  An 
Economic Approach to Removing the Boob From the Tube, 13 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 187, 194 
(2006) (labeling FCC enforcement methods an “applause test”).  The FCC does not 
monitor indecency (or related) violations, but rather, relies on a complaint process 
whereby viewers’ complaints may be investigated to determine if a violation 
occurred.  2001 Enforcement Policies, 16 F.C.C.R. at 8015.  At least one watchdog group 
makes what is effectively one-click reporting to the FCC possible through its website.  
See Parents Television Council, File an Official Indecency Complaint With the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Now, https://www.parentstv.org/PTC/ 
fcc/fcccomplaint.asp (last visited Nov. 12, 2007) (providing a simple form which 
submits a complaint directly to the FCC). 
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Nevertheless, the FCC continues to navigate this complex area, 
imposing fines on broadcasters who violate its rules.21 
C. The Pacifica Framework:  The Court Permits Context-Based Restrictions 
on Indecent Broadcast Speech 
In the landmark case of FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,22 the Supreme 
Court outlined the standard for indecency regulation that still serves 
as the framework today.  In Pacifica, the Court was confronted with 
FCC regulation of a radio broadcast of comedian George Carlin’s 
“Seven Filthy Words” monologue.23  The speech at issue was Carlin’s 
use of seven curse words that did not qualify as unprotected obscene 
speech.24  The Court nevertheless held that the FCC may regulate 
indecent speech in broadcast, even when it is not obscene, because of 
the unique characteristics of the broadcast medium.25  The two 
special features of broadcast identified by the Court were that 
broadcast was a “uniquely pervasive” medium, capable of invading the 
privacy of the home, and that broadcast was “uniquely accessible to 
children.”26  Finding that these concerns warranted broadcast 
receiving “the most limited First Amendment protection,”27 the Court 
applied “less than strict scrutiny”28 and held that the FCC could 
                                                 
 21. For a chart summarizing the FCC’s indecency fining activity from 1970 
through 2004, see Frank Ahrens, FCC Indecency Fines, 1970–2004, 
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/business/graphics/ 
web-fcc970.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2008). 
 22. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
 23. Id. at 729.  For a full transcript of the monologue, see id. at 751–55. 
 24. Id. at 750. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 748–50. 
 27. See Id. at 748 (distinguishing the historically limited protection of broadcast 
speech from protected print speech and noting that “each medium of expression 
presents special First Amendment problems”); cf. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 
U.S. 495, 502–03 (1952) (holding that motion pictures are protected speech under 
the First Amendment but cautioning that the protection is not an “absolute freedom 
to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and all places”). 
 28. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 852 (E.D. Pa. 1996) 
(discussing Pacifica’s lowered scrutiny of speech restrictions in broadcast and 
concluding that strict scrutiny applies to Internet context regulations), aff’d, 521 U.S. 
844 (1997).  Strict scrutiny is typically applied to content-based regulations of speech 
and requires that laws “be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government 
interest.”  United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).  
The Pacifica Court did not explicitly adopt a standard of review for broadcast 
regulations nor did it conduct the typical balancing test between governmental 
interests and the means of achieving them.  Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748–50.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court approved the governmental interest in 
protecting children and deemed regulation of broadcast speech an acceptable way to 
achieve that goal at least in the specific circumstances of that case.  See id. at 749-50 
(citing Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) for the proposition that the goal 
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constitutionally regulate indecent speech like the Carlin monologue 
under a context-based standard.29  The Court explicitly cautioned, 
however, that they were not holding that an “occasional expletive . . . 
would justify any sanction” and that the context of the speech was 
“all-important.”30 
D. From Pacifica to 2003:  The FCC Expands Indecency Regulation While 
Exempting Fleeting Expletives 
In the years following Pacifica, the FCC pursued a lax enforcement 
policy of indecent speech, limiting actionable indecency to the seven 
dirty words in the Carlin monologue.31  In 1987, however, the 
Commission announced that indecency determinations would be 
made without regard to whether they contained one of the seven 
words at issue in Pacifica and instead would be evaluated under the 
generalized contextual test that remains in place today.32  The 
contextual definition adopted was virtually identical to the test at the 
time of the Pacifica case:  “‘language that describes, in terms patently 
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the 
broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities or organs, when 
there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.’”33  
The Commission successfully defended this indecency definition 
against constitutional challenges in 1988,34 with the approving court 
                                                 
of enabling parents to control the content to which their children are exposed, when 
combined with the ease of access to such content, “amply justif[ies] special treatment 
of indecent broadcasting”). 
 29. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750 (specifying that the content of a broadcast 
program will “affect the composition of the audience” and that the Commission’s 
approach to indecency determinations “requires consideration of a host of 
variables”). 
 30. See id. (emphasizing the narrowness of the holding and explicitly not 
deciding that an “occasional expletive” in the setting of a “two-way radio 
conversation . . . or a telecast of an Elizabethan comedy” would be actionable 
indecency).  The Court also made clear that it had not decided whether regulation 
would be permissible late at night when audiences contain “so few children.”  Id. at 
750 n.28. 
 31. See generally Brian J. Rooder, Note, Broadcast Indecency Regulation in the Era of 
the “Wardrobe Malfunction”:  Has the FCC Grown Too Big For its Britches?, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 871, 882–83 (2005) (describing relaxed FCC indecency regulation between 
Pacifica and 1987 when the FCC adopted their current contextual approach). 
 32. See Infinity Broad. Corp. of Pa. (1987 Reconsideration Order), 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 
930 (1987) (indicating that there previously had been an “[u]nstated, but widely 
assumed” presumption that only the language of the Carlin monologue, presented in 
a deliberately shocking manner, would be actionable and abandoning that 
presumption in favor of the “more difficult” contextual approach). 
 33. See id. (reiterating the indecency definition at issue in Pacifica and assuming 
that the Court had implicitly agreed with its constitutionality). 
 34. See Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (Act I), 852 F.2d 1332, 1338–39 
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (concluding that the FCC’s definition of indecency was not 
unconstitutionally vague and finding support in Pacifica’s holding which quoted parts 
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issuing a caveat that the FCC’s enforcement decisions remain 
reasonable and not create an impermissible chilling effect on free 
speech.35 
The Commission eventually settled on a policy where indecency 
could be sanctioned under the aforementioned test during a 6 a.m. 
to 10 p.m. “safe harbor” period during which children were 
presumptively in the audience.36  Until the forfeitures at issue in Fox 
Television, however, the FCC considered “deliberate and repetitive 
use” of offensive words to be a prerequisite for finding them 
actionable when the words were mere expletives not describing 
sexual or excretory functions.37 
Because of uncertainty among broadcasters regarding what speech 
was actionable, the FCC attempted to clarify its indecency standards 
in a 2001 Policy Statement.38  The Policy Statement announced 
several factors to be considered in determining if speech was 
“patently offensive,” which included: 
(1) the explicitness or graphic nature of the description or depiction 
of sexual or excretory organs or activities; (2) whether the material 
dwells on or repeats at length descriptions of sexual or excretory 
                                                 
of the indecency definition with “seeming approval”)), overruled in part by Action for 
Children’s Television v. FCC (Act III), 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
 35. Id. at 1340 n.14 (citing Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 761 (Powell, J., concurring)).  
Again in 1991, see Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (Act II), 932 F.2d 1504, 
1508 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (rejecting vagueness and overbreadth challenges to the 
indecency definition), and 1995, see Act III, 58 F.3d at 659 (noting that petitioners 
had “failed to provide any convincing reasons” to ignore precedent and declining to 
overrule prior decisions upholding the indecency definition), the indecency 
definition was attacked as unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, and both times the 
challenges were dismissed on grounds that the definition had been implicitly 
approved as constitutional by the Pacifica Court. 
 36. See Act III, 58 F.3d at 664–67, 670 (balancing the First Amendment rights of 
adults to see and hear indecent broadcast material with the government’s 
“compelling interest” in protecting children from such content and requiring the 
FCC to confine its ban on indecent programming to between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 
p.m.). 
 37. See Pacifica Foundation Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698, 2699 (1987)  
([W]e believe that under the legal standards set forth in Pacifica, deliberate 
and repetitive use in a patently offensive manner is a requisite to a finding of 
indecency. When a complaint goes beyond the use of expletives, however, 
repetition of specific words or phrases is not necessarily an element critical 
to a determination of indecency. Rather, speech involving the description or 
depiction of sexual or excretory functions must be examined in context to 
determine whether it is patently offensive under contemporary community 
standards applicable to the broadcast medium. The mere fact that specific 
words or phrases are not repeated does not mandate a finding that material 
that is otherwise patently offensive to the broadcast medium is not 
indecent.). 
 38. Industry Guidance on Commission’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 
and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency (2001 Enforcement Policies), 
16 F.C.C.R. 7999 (2001). 
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organs or activities; (3) whether the material appears to pander or is used 
to titillate, or whether the material appears to have been presented for its 
shock value.39 
The FCC also noted in reference to fleeting expletives that, 
[r]epetition of and persistent focus on sexual or excretory material 
have been cited consistently as factors that exacerbate the potential 
offensiveness of broadcasts . . . [but] where sexual or excretory 
references have been made once or have been passing or fleeting 
in nature, this characteristic has tended to weigh against a finding 
of indecency.40 
That policy was soon to change. 
II. CHANGES IN THE AIR . . . WAVES 
A. The Golden Globes Decision 
Beginning in 2003, several highly publicized incidents of expletives 
aired on broadcast television41 prompting the FCC to change its long-
standing policy that fleeting expletives did not warrant sanction.42  
During the 2003 live broadcast of the Golden Globe Awards, Bono, a 
singer in the popular band U2, upon winning an award for best 
original song, exclaimed in delight, “this is really, really fucking 
brilliant.”43  After receiving “hundreds of complaints”44 that the “F-
word” was obscene and indecent, the FCC Enforcement Bureau 
initially ruled that the word, because of its fleeting use and context 
(i.e., as an intensifier, rather than a sexual description), was not 
                                                 
 39. Id. at 8003.  The Commission also stressed in the statement that the “full 
context” of the speech is to be considered and that indecency determinations are 
made on a “highly fact-specific” basis.  Id. at 8002. 
 40. Id. at 8009.  It is critical to note that this statement was not phrased as an 
absolute requirement of repetition.  See id. (“[E]ven relatively fleeting references may 
be found indecent where other factors contribute to a finding of patent 
offensiveness.  Examples of such factors . . . include broadcasting references to sexual 
activities with children and airing material that, although fleeting, is graphic or 
explicit.”). 
 41. See, e.g., Julie Hilden, Bono, Nicole Richie, and the F-word:  Broadcast Indecency 
Law, CNN.COM, Dec. 23, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/12/23/findlaw.an 
alysis.hilden.indecency/index.html?iref=newssearch (remarking that the incidents 
“fueled a furor among Congress and concerned parents”). 
 42. See Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing 
of the “Golden Globe Awards” Program (Golden Globes Complaint), 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 
4978–80 (2004) (“While prior Commission and staff action have indicated that 
isolated or fleeting broadcasts of the ‘F-word’ such as that here are not indecent or 
would not be acted upon, consistent with our decision today we conclude that any 
such interpretation is no longer good law.”). 
 43. Id. at 4976 n.4. 
 44. Id. 
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actionable indecency.45  Under pressure from Congress,46 however, 
the FCC reversed the Enforcement Bureau’s decision47 and decided 
that, “given the core meaning of the ‘F-Word,’ any use of that word or 
a variation, in any context, inherently has a sexual connotation, and 
therefore falls within the first prong of our indecency definition.”48  
The Commission then concluded that Bono’s specific use of the “F-
word,” despite its lack of repetition, met its definition of patently 
offensive under contemporary community standards for the 
broadcast medium,49 and put broadcasters on notice that they would 
be subject to forfeiture penalties in the future for even fleeting 
expletives such as the Bono incident.50 
This decision changed the treatment of single expletives because, 
depending on the expletive, they were now presumed to be sexual or 
excretory references and thus within the first prong of the indecency 
definition.51  After the distinction between expletives and sexual or 
excretory references was dismissed as “artificial,” the “F-word” and “S-
word” were placed into the category of language for which repetition 
had arguably never been required in order to make a determination 
of patent offensiveness, thereby allowing them to satisfy both prongs 
of the indecency analysis.52 
                                                 
 45. See Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding their Airing of 
the “Golden Globes Awards” Program (Enforcement Bureau Golden Globes), 18 F.C.C.R. 
19859, 19861 (2003) (noting that the word “fuck” in the Bono context was fleeting 
and did not describe sexual or excretory activity or organs, but rather was used as an 
“adjective or expletive”). 
 46. See H.R. Res. 500, 108th Cong. (2004) (“[T]he Federal Communications 
Commission should make every reasonable and lawful effort and use all of its 
available authority to protect children from the degrading influences of indecent 
and profane programming.”); S. Res. 283, 108th Cong. (2003) (resolving that the 
FCC should reverse the finding of no indecency violation in the Golden Globes 
complaint and heighten enforcement of decency standards). 
 47. See Golden Globes Complaint, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4982 (explaining the holding and 
indicating that the decision is consistent with Pacifica). 
 48. Id. at 4978. 
 49. Id. at 4979. 
 50. Id. at 4982.  The Commission also held that the word “fuck” was, in addition 
to being indecent, “profane” under 18 U.S.C. § 1464.  Id. at 4981.  In making this 
determination, the FCC departed from previous definitions of profane which 
referred only to blasphemous language, and instead adopted the standard that 
“‘vulgar, irreverent, or coarse language’” now constituted profanity.  Id. (quoting 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1210 (6th ed. 1990)).  The new profanity standard presents 
a different set of issues and is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 51. See id. at 4978 (acknowledging but dismissing broadcasters’ argument that 
the “F-word” in the Bono context was an “intensifier” and did not have a sexual 
meaning); see also In re. Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698, 2699 (1987) 
(distinguishing between the use of “expletives” and descriptions of sexual or 
excretory functions). 
 52. See Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2, 
2002 and March 8, 2005 (Golden Globes Remand Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13308 
(2006), vacated by Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007) 
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B. The Facts of Fox Television:  The 2002 & 2003 Billboard Music 
Awards 
Following the Golden Globes decision, the FCC issued an Omnibus 
Order attempting to clarify and provide guidance to broadcasters 
through indecency determinations on various incidents.53  Among the 
incidents addressed were the 2002 and 2003 Billboard Music Awards 
in which Cher and Nicole Richie, in respective years, each used a 
variant of the word “fuck” and Richie said “shit” in reference to cow 
excrement in her reality show, “The Simple Life.”54  The Commission, 
relying on the new fleeting expletive policy announced in the Golden 
Globes decision, found each to be indecent but declined to issue 
forfeitures because the new policy had not been announced at the 
time of the broadcasts.55 
Fox and CBS sought review of the Omnibus Order in the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit and, after a remand to the FCC, who 
affirmed its rulings on both Billboard Music Awards incidents,56 the 
case was reinstated in the Second Circuit.57  The issue on appeal was 
                                                 
(arguing that “Bureau-level decisions issued before Golden Globe had suggested that 
expletives had to be repeated to be indecent but descriptions or depictions of sexual 
or excretory functions did not need to be repeated to be indecent” (internal 
quotations omitted)).  The FCC actually altered both parts of its indecency test.  
First, it allowed mere expletives to be considered sexual or excretory references, thus 
permitting “fuck” to satisfy the first prong.  See id. at 13304 (“Given the core meaning 
of the ‘F-Word,’ any use of that word has a sexual connotation.”).  Second, it 
dispensed with the requirement that material be repeated to be considered patently 
offensive.  Id. at 13305–08.  Although the distinctions between the first and second 
prong of the test tend to be blurred, the blurring has no consequence for the 
purposes of this Note because the FCC’s test, despite attempts at separating it into 
two distinct parts, remains a contextual determination of indecency. 
 53. See Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between February 2, 
2002 and March 8, 2005 (Omnibus Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 2664, 2665 (2006), modified by 
Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2, 2002 and 
March 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299 (2006) (addressing the “increasing public unease 
with the nature of broadcast material” and responding to broadcasters’ uncertainty 
about the indecency standard’s application by applying the indecency test to a 
“broad range of factual patterns” to “provide substantial guidance”). 
 54. See id. at 2692–95 (providing an overview of Nicole Richie’s use of expletives 
and the ensuing legal action). 
 55. See id. (noting that Fox did not take appropriate steps to prevent the 
utterance of expletives, but declining to impose any sanctions due to standing 
“precedent”); see also Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 204 (1988) 
(deciding that agencies may not issue rules with retroactive effect unless their 
statutory rulemaking authority explicitly delegates such retroactive power). 
 56. See Golden Globes Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 13311–13, 13325 (looking to 
Nicole Richie’s reputation for such remarks as a factor in holding a broadcaster 
liable and further explaining that Cher’s use of an expletive during prime time 
television, coupled with the lack of advance notice from broadcasters to viewers, 
rendered the act offensive). 
 57. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 454 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(providing a synopsis of the discussion portion of the court’s opinion).  CBS and 
NBC intervened in the case despite the fact that the FCC had reversed its indecency 
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the validity of the fleeting expletive policy with respect to only the two 
Billboard Music Awards incidents, but the court seized the 
opportunity to review the policy rather than the individual 
decisions—although not with the finality that broadcasters would 
have hoped.58 
III. PREVIOUS COURT TREATMENT OF THE FCC’S INDECENCY POLICY 
UNDER ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS REVIEW. 
A. Brief Overview of Judicial Review Under the  
Administrative Procedure Act 
Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, courts may set aside 
agency decisions that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion 
or not in accordance with law.”59  According to the Supreme Court, 
the factors making an agency decision arbitrary and capricious 
include failing to consider crucial aspects of the problem, offering 
explanations at odds with the relevant evidence, or offering 
implausible solutions that cannot be explained by agency expertise or 
a difference of opinion.60  In total, the standard can be summarized, 
albeit vaguely, as requiring the agency to put forth a “satisfactory 
explanation”61 for the challenged action. 
In guiding the level of review under this standard, the Court has 
said that reviewing courts should “uphold a decision of less than ideal 
clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.”62  Despite 
some disagreement and uncertainty,63 it is also generally agreed that 
                                                 
determinations against their shows N.Y.P.D. Blue (dismissed on procedural grounds) 
and The Early Show (reversed due to context being a “bona fide news interview”).  Id. 
at 453–54. 
 58. See id. at 454 (“[T]he validity of the new ‘fleeting expletive’ policy announced 
in Golden Globes and applied in the Remand Order is a question properly before us 
on this petition for review.”).  In holding the policy to be arbitrary and capricious 
rather than unconstitutional, the court left open the possibility of the FCC resuming 
the identical scheme after bolstering their reasoning on remand.  See Fox Television, 
489 F.3d at 462 (“[W]e doubt that the Networks will refrain from further litigation 
on these precise issues if, on remand, the Commission merely provides further 
explanation with no other changes to its policy.”). 
 59. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000). 
 60. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 43 (1983). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. (quoting Bowman Transp. Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 
281, 286 (1974)). 
 63. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 
(1971) (describing arbitrary and capricious review as “searching and careful”).  See 
generally Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in Midpassage:  The Uneasy Partnership Between 
Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221 (1996) (recounting the fluctuating 
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“[t]he scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is 
narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the 
agency.”64 
The level of scrutiny under the arbitrary and capricious standard is 
controversial,65 and it has been suggested that arbitrariness review is 
similar, if not identical, to the second prong of agency review under 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.66  In the 
absence of clear statutory language, Chevron requires the 
determination of whether an agency construction of their statutory 
mandate is reasonable.67  Chevron has also come to stand for the 
proposition—known as Chevron deference—that courts should defer 
to reasonable or permissible agency constructions of unclear 
statutes.68 
A detailed examination of the debate regarding the overlap 
between Chevron step two and arbitrary and capricious review is 
outside the scope of this discussion,69 but this Note will proceed 
under the assumption that under either Chevron reasonableness70 or 
                                                 
levels of judicial review under the APA and highlighting key areas of academic 
debate on the subject). 
 64. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. 
 65. See generally Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and 
Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1080 
(1995) (discussing the scope of review under substantive review doctrines and 
concluding that Congress should create more specific guidelines to reduce 
“outcome-oriented behavior by judges”). 
 66. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 67. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864–65; Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron:  
Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1295–97 (1997) (arguing that 
Chevron step two and arbitrary and capricious review should be considered identical). 
 68. See generally A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 
85 (John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., ABA 2005) [hereinafter JUDICIAL REVIEW].  
The Fox Television court did not explicitly apply Chevron deference to the FCC’s policy 
change, but nevertheless cited it for the proposition that “agencies are of course free 
to revise their rules and policies.”  Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 
456 (2007).  One potential explanation for the lack of specific Chevron deference is 
that the FCC’s indecency definition is technically an interpretation of the federal 
statute criminalizing indecent broadcast speech rather than an interpretation of an 
explicitly FCC-administered statute.  See JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra, at 113 (explaining 
that Chevron applies only to statutory conferrals of authority where “Congress would 
expect the agency to speak with the force of law” in interpreting the statute).  
Although an argument could be made that Chevron should apply because the FCC is 
specifically authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(D) to enforce 18 U.S.C. § 1464 
(criminalizing broadcast indecency) through forfeitures, this Note assumes that the 
level of deference should be similarly high under arbitrary and capricious review, 
which renders the issue superfluous. 
 69. For a detailed examination of this topic, see Levin, supra note 67. 
 70. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863–66.  As noted above, the Fox Television court did 
not claim to apply Chevron deference, but cited it in reference to agency deference.  
See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 456. 
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arbitrary and capricious review,71 at least some deference should be 
afforded to agency interpretations.72  The unclear standards for 
exactly what is necessary to find an agency’s explanation of its choices 
to be arbitrary73 have led to a steady stream of criticism.  That 
criticism expresses the view that many judicial decisions are the 
product of mere disagreement with the agency’s outcome rather than 
a truly impermissible flaw in the agency’s decision-making process or 
authority.74  The lack of deference given by the court to the FCC in 
Fox Television is an example of such an activist judicial attitude.75 
B. Comparison of Judicial Review in Fox Television with Action for 
Children’s Television v. FCC 
The Fox Television court erred in holding the FCC’s new policy on 
fleeting expletives to be arbitrary and capricious and overreached the 
appropriate standard of review, consequently substituting its 
judgment for that of the agency.  Considering the variability with 
which arbitrary and capricious review has been applied,76 however, 
                                                 
 71. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 41–45 (developing the guidelines for arbitrary and capricious review that 
currently guide courts). 
 72. But see Wald, supra note 63, at 244–45 (“The rule in our [D.C.] circuit, as 
elsewhere, is that Chevron deference gets trumped by the canon requiring avoidance 
of unnecessary constitutional determinations.  Consequently, we do not ordinarily 
defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute if that interpretation raises a serious 
constitutional question that another interpretation might avoid.”).  However, the 
author also argues that the “mere fact” that an agency makes policy determinations 
that carry constitutional implications should not counsel courts to abandon 
deference unless the agency’s interpretation raises a “concrete and avoidable 
constitutional question.”  Id. at 246.  Such a rule of constitutional avoidance probably 
represents the best argument in support of the lack of deference displayed by the Fox 
Television court.  However, as argued infra Part V, the fleeting expletives policy did 
not raise any new constitutional questions in and of itself.  Therefore, the court 
could have deferred to the FCC on the fleeting expletive policy without addressing 
any avoidable constitutional questions. 
 73. See, e.g., Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co. v. EPA, 8 F.3d 73, 77 (1st Cir. 1993)(“The 
‘arbitrary or capricious’ concept, needless to say, is not easy to encapsulate in a single 
list of rubrics because it embraces a myriad of possible faults and depends heavily 
upon the circumstances of the case.”). 
 74. See generally Wald, supra note 63, at 234 (“The acknowledged impossibility of 
specifying the components of ‘adequate explanation’ inevitably leaves courts open to 
the charge that the results of our review are inconsistent and reflect the political or 
philosophical preferences of the judges on the panel rather than any objective 
standard.”). 
 75. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 65, at 1067 (arguing that the “relatively 
indeterminate” definition of arbitrary and capricious combined with the 
“manipulable categories to which different degrees of deference apply” creates an 
environment where judges are “freer to pursue an outcome orientation”). 
 76. See JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 68, at 177–81 (discussing the debate over the 
proper level of arbitrary and capricious review and noting that proponents of 
minimal review emphasize that courts should not substitute their judgment for the 
agency’s, while advocates of stringent or “hard look” review argue that a higher 
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the decision was not blatantly erroneous.77  Nevertheless, the court 
gave substantially less deference to the FCC’s new policy 
determination than has been given in the past to FCC constructions 
of its indecency regulating duties. 
The most clearly analogous arbitrary and capricious challenge to 
an FCC indecency construction was entertained in 1988 regarding a 
major shift in the FCC’s standard for indecency determinations.  In 
Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (Act I),78 the FCC defended their 
1987 decision to adopt the current contextual standard for indecency 
rather than using George Carlin’s seven dirty words as their effective 
“yardstick for ‘indecency,’”79 as they had done from Pacifica until 
1987.80  This expansion was not insignificant.81  Judge (now Justice) 
Ginsburg, writing for the D.C. Court of Appeals, accepted the FCC’s 
explanation for the change in course and held that the expansion 
was not an arbitrary and capricious agency action.82 
In Act I, the FCC’s justification for moving beyond regulating only 
the seven Carlin words was that such an interpretation of indecency 
was “unduly narrow as a matter of law”83 and inconsistent with its 
enforcement duties.  The FCC determined that the Carlin standard 
essentially gave blanket permission to broadcasters to air offensive 
material as long as it was not one of seven prohibited words, repeated 
at length.84  Without much discussion, the court found the FCC’s 
explanation adequate to defeat a claim that the change in standard 
                                                 
standard reduces the risk that agency decisions will be based on impermissible 
political considerations); see also text and notes supra Part III.A (surveying the debate 
over substantive review doctrines). 
 77. See Shapiro, supra note 65, at 1065–66 (labeling the arbitrary and capricious 
standard “open-ended” and pointing to examples of the Court’s “conflicting 
messages concerning the appropriate level of deference”). 
 78. 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988), overruled in part by Action for Children’s 
Television v. FCC (Act III), 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
 79. See id. at 1336, 1337–38 (recalling that, prior to the change, sanctionable 
material had to be “similar or identical” to the George Carlin monologue); see also 
Infinity Broad. Corp. of Pa. (1987 Reconsideration Order), 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 930 (1987) 
(“Unstated, but widely assumed . . . was the belief that only material that closely 
resembled the George Carlin monologue would satisfy the indecency test articulated 
by the FCC in 1975.”). 
 80. See 1987 Reconsideration Order, 3 F.C.C.R. at 930 (noting that the FCC took no 
indecency action against broadcasters from 1975 until 1987). 
 81. See Act I, 852 F.2d at 1338.  The change in indecency policy at issue in Act I 
was a major leap from regulating only seven words to regulating indecency in 
general, which includes visual depictions as well as audio. 
 82. See id. at 1338. 
 83. 1987 Reconsideration Order, 3 F.C.C.R. at 930. 
 84. Id.  The FCC also acknowledged that a contextual standard would be the 
“more difficult approach,” but would aid in curing the “anomalous [sic] result[]” 
that children could be exposed to indecent material “simply because [broadcasters] 
avoided certain words.” Id. 
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was arbitrary and capricious.85  The court noted that, short of a bright-
line test that identified only seven repeated words as indecent, the 
FCC would need a more “expansive” definition and the parties had 
suggested no “tighter” formulation.86 
Instead of reading the FCC’s authority as limited to the precise 
factual situation of Pacifica, the court implicitly agreed that the broad 
definition of indecency, rather than the specific circumstances of the 
Carlin monologue, was the proper scope of FCC’s authority after 
Pacifica.87  The court also agreed, or at least did not find a fatal 
reasoning flaw, with the FCC’s view that the narrow standard could 
lead to “anomalous, even arbitrary, results.”88  Significantly, the court 
concluded that the “difficulty, or ‘abiding discomfort’. . . is not the 
absence of ‘reasoned analysis’ on the Commission’s part, but the 
‘vagueness . . . inherent in the subject matter.’”89  The court then 
moved on to a challenge of unconstitutional vagueness and, 
reasoning that the Pacifica court had implicitly approved the 
Commission’s indecency definition as constitutional, held itself 
precluded from finding otherwise.90 
The Second Circuit, in deciding Fox Television, faced a similar 
arbitrary and capricious challenge to a change in policy as the one 
denied by the D.C. Circuit in Act I but came to the opposite 
conclusion.91  In Fox Television, however, the court decided a narrower 
question because it dealt with the comparatively slight expansion of 
the broad, context-based standard already approved in Act I.  The Fox 
Television court’s issue was not whether indecency determinations 
should be contextual, but rather, whether the Commission 
adequately explained why lack of repetition would no longer be 
deemed a dispositive factor in the contextual analysis.92 
                                                 
 85. See Act I, 852 F.2d at 1338 (finding the FCC’s explanation “adequate,” and 
commenting that the FCC “rationally determined that its former policy could yield 
anomalous, even arbitrary results”). 
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. (suggesting that the “thesis that only seven dirty words are properly 
designated indecent” is not a correct interpretation of Pacifica). 
 88. See id. (commenting that the petitioner-broadcasters had disavowed the 
argument that “only the seven words are properly designated indecent”). 
 89. Id. (quoting Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
(Leventhal, J., dissenting), rev’d, 438 U.S 726 (1978)). 
 90. Id. at 1339 (inviting correction from “Higher Authority” on the court’s 
reading of Pacifica). 
 91. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 454 (2d Cir. 2007).  In the 
beginning of the Fox Television opinion, the court quotes Act I for the proposition 
that “‘the agency may not resort to adjudication as a means of insulating a generic 
standard from judicial review.’”  Id. (quoting Act I, 852 F.2d at 1337). 
 92. Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 454. 
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The court should have found, like the D.C. Circuit in Act I, that the 
change in policy was not arbitrary and capricious, thereby moving on 
to the constitutional challenges to the policy.93  First, in Act I, the FCC 
offered only two generalized explanations for broadening 
enforcement beyond Carlin’s seven filthy words.94  The FCC argued 
that the old test was too narrow and that it allowed the broadcast of 
material that may harm children as long as it did not contain certain 
words.95  In Fox Television, the FCC offered a similar, but more 
thoroughly reasoned, rationale to explain the new presumption that 
the “F” and “S” words were presumptively sexual or excretory 
references needing no repetition to be considered indecent.96  The 
FCC found that “categorically requiring repeated use of expletives,” 
much like categorically requiring certain words in Act I, was 
inconsistent with the context-based approach and that the single 
factor of repetition should not “always be decisive.”97 
The FCC also justified the change on the grounds that allowing 
fleeting expletives forced viewers to take the “first blow,”98 and would 
permit broadcasters to “air expletives at all hours of the day so long as 
they did so one at a time.”99  The FCC’s arguments in Fox Television, 
therefore, were almost mirror images of their arguments in Act I, 
focusing on the Commission’s determination that the previous policy 
was anomalous and inconsistent within the contextual standard 
approved by the Court in Pacifica.  Given that the policy change in Act 
I was considerably more expansive than the one at issue in Fox 
Television, the Fox Television court should have given more deference 
to the FCC and should have found its explanation adequate to defeat 
the arbitrary and capricious challenge. 
                                                 
 93. This Note argues infra Part V that the policy change was not unconstitutional 
under current law. 
 94. See Act I, 852 F.2d at 1338 (addressing the FCC’s determination that it made 
no “legal or policy sense” to regulate only certain words). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 459–60 (discussing the FCC’s contention that it 
is “difficult (if not impossible)” to tell when a swear word is used as an expletive or a 
description of sexual or excretory function) (internal quotations and citation 
omitted).  The FCC also explained that a categorical exemption for single utterances 
was inconsistent with the context-based approach and would “permit broadcasters to 
air expletives at all hours of the day so long as they did so one at a time.”  Id. at 460 
(internal quotations and citation omitted). 
 97. Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2, 2002 
and March 8, 2005 (Golden Globes Remand Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13308 (2006), 
vacated by Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 98. For an analysis for the “first blow” theory, see discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 99. Golden Globes Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 13309. 
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IV. OTHER SPECIFIC PROBLEMS WITH THE FOX TELEVISION COURT’S 
BASES FOR FINDING THE POLICY CHANGE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS 
As discussed above, the Fox Television court should have deferred to 
the FCC’s decision because the FCC offered a reasoned explanation 
for the change in policy that was more extensive than the reasoning 
behind a much larger policy change in Act I.100  Instead, without 
settling on a concrete basis for finding the FCC’s decision arbitrary 
and capricious,101 the Fox Television court found the fatal flaw to be a 
general failure to articulate a reasoned basis for the change.102  The 
court found that:  (1) the “first blow” theory did not justify the 
change in policy; (2) the new presumption was inconsistent with a 
context-based approach; (3) the prediction that broadcasters could 
air expletives all day as long as they were isolated was “divorced from 
reality;” and (4) there was no evidence to suggest that a single 
expletive was even harmful.103  Issues with the court’s first two 
arguments will be analyzed together and the following two in turn. 
A. “First Blow” Theory and Context-Based Approach 
The Fox Television court focused primarily on the Commission’s 
proffered justification that protecting children from the “first blow”104 
of expletives was better accomplished by prohibiting single 
occurrences of such words.105  The court concluded that the first blow 
rationale was inconsistent with the context-based exceptions because 
                                                 
 100. See discussion supra Part III. 
 101. The court articulated many of the common reasons for setting aside an 
agency decision including a lack of rational connection between the “facts found and 
the choice made,” reliance on factors that Congress did not intend to be considered, 
failing to consider an important aspect of the problem and offering an explanation 
counter to the evidence.  Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 454–55 (quoting Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).  
Ultimately the court’s review simply concluded that the FCC failed “to provide a 
reasoned analysis.”  Id. at 462. 
 102. Id. at 458. 
 103. Id. at 459. 
 104. The “first blow” concept was first articulated in Pacifica as a component of the 
reasoning that broadcast media are pervasive and enter into the home as intruders, 
and thus, the normal duty to avert one’s attention when confronted with unwelcome 
speech gives way to the need to protect children in the home from the “first blow” of 
offensive content.  See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 (1978) (“To say 
that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent 
language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first 
blow.”). 
 105. See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 457–58 (discussing the FCC’s “first blow” theory 
as the primary reason for the agency crackdown on fleeting expletives). 
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children could still be subjected to the first blow of indecent 
language in certain circumstances.106 
The rationale behind the “first blow” theory advanced in Pacifica 
was that requiring the listener to turn off the radio after hearing an 
offensive word was like asking them to run away from an assault after 
the first blow, which was unacceptable in the home and therefore 
justified lowering First Amendment protection.107  According to the 
Court’s analogy, running away from the first blow does not “avoid a 
harm that has already taken place.”108  The Court also noted that a 
broadcasted expletive could “enlarge[] a child’s vocabulary in an 
instant,”109 thus strongly suggesting that the first “fuck” or “shit” that 
slipped by before turning off the set was worth curbing First 
Amendment protection.110  The theory was advanced as a way around 
the criticism that one could easily turn off the offending source, 
much like averting one’s eyes to objectionable content in a public 
space.111  Thus, the “first blow” theory, by its nature, was designed to 
protect against the first offensive word,112 which calls into question the 
Fox Television court’s especially critical view of the FCC’s inclusion of 
single expletives into the category of actionable speech. 
The Fox Television court’s essential argument was that the “first 
blow” theory, as justification for finding single expletives indecent, 
was inconsistent with the FCC’s context-based standard which allows 
for certain artistic113 and news exceptions114 that may make otherwise 
                                                 
 106. See id. at 458–59 (citing, for example, the FCC’s previous exemptions for 
expletives in a “bona fide news interview” and arguing that children who may not 
realize why the words are “integral” would be subjected to the first blow) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 107. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748–50 (relating the first blow concept to nuisance 
theory in the sense that it was applied to prohibit otherwise acceptable speech in the 
“wrong place,” (i.e., intruding into the privacy of the home)). 
 108. Id. at 749. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 748–49. 
 111. See id. at 748–49 n.27 (distinguishing its case from Cohen v. California, 403 
U.S. 15 (1971), on the grounds that “[o]utside the home, the balance between the 
offensive speaker and the unwilling audience may sometimes tip in favor of the 
speaker, requiring the listener to turn away”). 
 112. The Court did not, however, explicitly decide whether single utterances 
could be sanctioned.  See id. at 750 (“We have not decided that an occasional 
expletive . . . would justify any sanction.”). 
 113. See, e.g., Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Regarding Their 
Broadcast on November 11, 2004, of The ABC Television Network’s Presentation of 
The Film Saving Private Ryan, 20 F.C.C.R. 4507, 4513 (2005) (finding expletives 
during broadcast of war film not indecent because of integral nature of expletives to 
historical context and artistic depiction of reality). 
 114. See, e.g., Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2, 
2002 and March 8, 2005 (Golden Globes Remand Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13327 
(2006), vacated by Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007) 
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indecent speech justifiable.115  But in so arguing, the court 
contradicted itself by attacking the fleeting expletive policy as 
inconsistent with a context-based approach,116 while simultaneously 
faulting the context-based exceptions as inconsistent with the primary 
rationale for regulating broadcast indecency—protecting children 
from the harm (i.e., the “first blow”) of indecent speech.117 
In scrutinizing this perceived discrepancy between the 
Commission’s actual policy and the “first blow” theory, the court felt 
that undiscriminating children, unable to differentiate appropriate 
contexts from inappropriate ones, would be subject to the “first blow” 
of offensive language in some situations but not others.118  As pointed 
out by the dissenting judge, however, this critique applies to the 
entire rationale for broadcast regulation as much as it applies to the 
change in fleeting expletive policy.119  Moreover, the FCC’s new 
treatment of fleeting expletives did not guarantee that “any 
occurrence of an expletive is indecent or profane,” but rather, that 
fleeting expletives could be actionable.120 
The court’s critique therefore focused on the inconsistency with 
which the indecency standard is applied generally, rather than the 
inclusion of fleeting expletives as actionable.121  The court admitted as 
much, commenting that the first blow theory “bears no rational 
connection to the Commission’s actual policy regarding fleeting 
expletives.”122  Under the court’s reasoning, it seems that the “first 
                                                 
(reaffirming the need for a restrained approach to indecency determinations in 
“news and public affairs programming”). 
 115. See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 458–59 (rebutting the dissent’s suggestion that 
the majority’s issue was with the inconsistency of the policy with the first blow theory, 
while simultaneously maintaining that the rationale was “disconnected from the 
actual policy implemented by the Commission”).  
 116. See id. at 458–59 (implying that a context-based approach to indecency 
determinations is proper). 
 117. See id. at 458 (faulting the FCC for “chang[ing] its perception that a fleeting 
expletive was not a harmful ‘first blow’ for nearly thirty years” after Pacifica). 
 118. Id.  If the court’s argument that children do not understand the importance 
of context is carried to its logical conclusion, then any context-based standard would 
presumably be deemed inconsistent with the goal of protecting children from 
offensive language.  Id. at 459.  The balance between contextual exceptions and the 
need to protect children, however, is the basic balance struck by the Court in Pacifica.  
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978). 
 119. See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 471 (Leval, J., dissenting) (“If there is merit in 
the majority’s argument that the Commission’s actions are arbitrary and capricious 
because of irrationality in its standards . . . that argument must be directed against 
the entire censorship structure.”). 
 120. Id. at 458 n.7 (majority opinion). 
 121. See id. at 458–59 (highlighting various inconsistent FCC indecency decisions); 
see also Bungard, supra note 20, at 206–18 (reviewing FCC indecency decisions and 
finding a “blurred distinction” between what the FCC has determined to be or not to 
be indecent, resulting in chilled speech). 
 122. Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 458. 
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blow” theory would bear “no rational connection”123 to the context-
based approach in any case because, by their nature, contextual 
determinations allow children to take the first blow in certain 
situations while protecting them in others. 
Moreover, the FCC’s presumption that certain words are sexual or 
excretory references actually decreases uncertainty and inconsistency 
because it protects children from the first blow whenever it happens 
to be the only blow.124  Considering that a particular program 
segment rarely includes only a single expletive—even the Nicole 
Richie incident included several125—the presumption also removes 
broadcasters’ uncertainty as to how many utterances within a 
particular time frame would be actionable by placing all 
objectionable language on a level playing field.  The court thus 
faulted the FCC for failing to justify its entire indecency policy rather 
than simply the shift in policy, which is more a critique of the 
reasoning behind Pacifica’s holding than a critique of the FCC’s new 
presumption. 
B. Predictions of a Rise in Future Use of Expletives 
The Fox Television court also felt that the Commission had 
inaccurately predicted that expletive use would rise dramatically if 
single occurrences were not actionable.126  This determination almost 
certainly falls within the FCC’s area of expertise, and thus, should be 
given particular deference by judges who lack the agency’s 
expertise.127  Although the FCC did not cite to any hard data 
supporting their prediction,128 the increasing prevalence of expletives 
                                                 
 123. Id. 
 124. See id. at 471 (Leval, J., dissenting) (arguing that the inclusion of fleeting 
expletives makes the new policy more, rather than less, consistent because the 
context-based analysis applies to all circumstances without a blanket exception for 
isolated occurrences). 
 125. See Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2, 
2002 and Mar. 8, 2005 (Golden Globes Remand Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13308 
(2006), vacated by Fox Television, 489 F.3d 444 (majority opinion) (suggesting that 
Richie’s language would have been actionable even before the Golden Globes 
decision because it included more than one offensive word). 
 126. See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 460 (labeling the FCC’s prediction as “divorced 
from reality” on the ground that broadcasters did not “barrage[] the airwaves with 
expletives” before they became actionable indecency). 
 127. See, e.g., Cellnet Comm. Inc. v. FCC, 149 F.3d 429, 441 (6th Cir. 1998) (“It is 
well-established that under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, an 
agency’s predictive judgments about areas that are within the agency’s field of 
discretion and expertise are entitled to particularly deferential review.”). 
 128. See Golden Globes Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 13309 (contending that 
allowing fleeting expletives would “as a matter of logic permit broadcasters to air 
expletives at all hours of the day so long as they did so one at a time”) (emphasis 
added). 
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on television is common enough knowledge that the prediction 
should have been viewed as a policy judgment that was within the 
Commission’s discretion.129  Moreover, scholars have increasingly 
highlighted the concern that broadcast competes with unregulated 
speech on cable and satellite, and that by increasing racy content, 
broadcast is better able to compete.130  Given this trend, it is a 
reasonable assumption on the FCC’s part that expletive use would 
increase overall if single expletives were permitted.131 
C. Evidence of Harm 
The Fox Television court also improperly attacked the Commission 
on the ground that it did not provide any evidence to suggest that 
fleeting expletives were a “problem” (i.e., harmful to children) in the 
first place.132  The court cited United States v. Playboy Entertainment 
Group133 for the proposition that the agency must offer actual 
evidence of the harm sought to be addressed.134  The difficulty with 
the court’s reasoning, however, is that it drew an untenable 
comparison between Playboy’s problem of signal bleed occasionally 
leading to pornographic images appearing without a subscription to 
adult cable channels and the problem of fleeting expletives on 
broadcast television.135  This analysis fails to consider that the signal 
                                                 
 129. See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 472 (Leval, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[a]s a 
matter of law, it makes no difference” whose prediction about future expletive use is 
correct and that the court is required to defer to the agency’s judgment); see also 
Aurele Danoff, Comment, “Raised Eyebrows” Over Satellite Radio:  Has Pacifica Met its 
Match?, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 743, 776–77 (2007) (noting that broadcast is becoming more 
laced with expletives and violence as broadcasters attempt to “up the ante” to 
compete with “edgier” cable programming). 
 130. See Coates, supra note 19, at 777–78 (describing the nation’s “enduring 
affection for the tawdry, tacky, and scantily-clad”); see also Rosenblat, supra note 20, at 
189 (describing Howard Stern’s move from broadcast radio to satellite radio in order 
to be “beyond FCC control”). 
 131. See Rooder, supra note 31, at 901–03 (arguing that consumers watch offensive 
broadcasts even though they would prefer to have content regulated, which suggests 
that the broadcast industry will continue to air offensive content under the 
assumption that it is responding to market demand). 
 132. See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 461 (majority opinion) (suggesting that children 
today are exposed to expletives more often and from a wider variety of sources than 
in the past and requiring evidence that children in today’s world are harmed by 
fleeting expletives).  Again, this argument goes more towards the justification for 
regulating indecent speech at all, rather than the reasonableness of making single 
expletives actionable.  See generally Coates, supra note 19, at 776–78 (discussing how 
the standards of decency have changed over time). 
 133. 529 U.S. 803 (1994). 
 134. Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 461. 
 135. On the issue of proving a problem, the court also cited Quincy Cable TV, Inc. 
v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1985), which dealt with whether the FCC had 
adequately demonstrated that the government had a substantial interest in 
promoting local programming by requiring cable TV providers to carry certain local 
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bleed addressed in Playboy was a “phenomenon” that was not present 
on all televisions tuned to a specific channel at a specific time.136  
Unlike signal bleed, fleeting expletives, when broadcast, inevitably 
reach every television tuned to that particular station.  A distinction 
must therefore be drawn between the description of harm as 
“isolated” in Playboy and in Fox Television.  In Fox Television, the term 
describes expletives that are spoken only once but reach every 
television tuned to the program;137 in Playboy, the term connotes the 
sporadic nature of the images or audio actually reaching the 
audience.138  Thus, demanding proof that broadcast expletives are 
harmful is a matter of content evaluation, whereas demanding proof 
that signal bleed is harmful is a matter of the prevalence and 
frequency of admittedly harmful content.139 
Moreover, demanding proof of the harm to children of a single 
expletive—or even the harm of multiple expletives—is inconsistent 
with the theory behind broadcast regulation in general, and with the 
“first blow” theory specifically.140  The essential reason behind 
Pacifica’s approval of limited regulation was that children should not 
be exposed to offensive content in a pervasive and accessible medium 
such as broadcast.141  Thus, implicit in this rationale is the Supreme 
Court’s acceptance of Congress’ initial determination that indecent 
content is harmful.142  Additionally, it has been said that, “Congress 
                                                 
broadcast channels.  Id.  Similarly, the court cited Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 
F.2d 9, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1997), where the FCC was challenged on a cable access issue in 
which “content regulations . . . [were] not at issue.”  Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 49.  
Neither of these decisions is analogous to the governmental interest in protecting 
children from objectionable content. 
 136. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 806 (noting 
that technological scrambling techniques were “imprecise” and that audio or visual 
portions of blocked programs “might be heard or seen”). 
 137. See Fox Television, 461 F.3d at 452 (characterizing the use of the word 
“fucking” as “fleeting and isolated”). 
 138. See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 820–21 (using the word “isolate” to connote reported 
incidents of children actually seeing or hearing scrambled adult programming). 
 139. See id. (upholding the lower court’s determination that infrequent instances 
of signal bleed are insufficient to find a harm).  The prevalence of a technological 
anomaly is a more easily quantifiable measure of “harm” than the abstract notion of 
whether expletives are harmful to children. 
 140. See supra discussion in Part IV.A. 
 141. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–50 (1978). 
 142. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000) (providing fines and imprisonment for utterance 
of indecent language in broadcast).  Although the specific harm is not easy to define 
or quantify and is certainly not agreed upon, it is nevertheless an issue that Congress 
sought to control with legislation.  Cf. Jim Puzzanghera, Washington May Take Up TV 
Violence, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2007, at C1, available at http://www.commercialalert.org 
/news/archive/2007/01/washington-may-take-up-tv-violence (discussing potential 
legislation to curb television violence and noting that “[o]ne proposal would give 
regulators powers similar to those they have now to punish indecency and coarse 
language over the airwaves”). 
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does not need the testimony of psychiatrists and social scientists in 
order to take note of the coarsening of impressionable minds that 
can result from a persistent exposure to sexually explicit material just 
this side of obscenity.”143  Thus, the Fox Television court improperly 
faulted the FCC for not providing evidence to support the 
governmental concern on which the entire indecency regulatory 
scheme is based.144 
D. Other Arbitrary and Capricious Considerations Not Addressed by the Fox 
Television Court 
In addition to the fact that the D.C. Circuit had previously found a 
similar, but broader policy change adequately explained in Act I,145 
and despite the court’s overly searching examination of the FCC’s 
rationale and evidence,146 the policy change was supported by 
substantial explanation and reasoned analysis advanced in multiple 
Commission opinions.147  Moreover, although the Fox Television court 
disagreed with the FCC’s outcome, the policy change was endorsed 
by Congress and indirectly supported by recent legislation.148 
1. The FCC justified its change in policy in anticipating judicial review 
The Fox Television court’s lack of deference, on a broader level, was 
unsupported by the procedural status of the case and the resulting 
extensive explanation of the new policy.  It is generally stated that 
agency explanations are inadequate if they rely on faulty, implausible, 
                                                 
 143. Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (Act III), 58 F.3d 654, 662 (D.C. Cir. 
1995) (en banc); see also Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 
(1986) (requiring no scientific demonstration of psychic injury to determine that 
government has a compelling interest in protecting children from indecent speech). 
 144. But see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals Based Justifications for Lawmaking:  Before 
and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1305 (2004) (examining morals-
based legislation and proposing that the Court require fact-based rationales for 
government action).  Because the underlying indecency legislation is in many 
respects morals legislation, there is a possibility, albeit highly unlikely, that under this 
type of rationale, the Court could strike it down as a factually unsupported 
government interest.  Id. cf. Mark Cenite, Federalizing or Eliminating Online Obscenity 
Law as an Alternative to Contemporary Community Standards, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 25, 66–
69 (2004) (suggesting that laws against obscenity may be vulnerable to attack on 
grounds that they are purely morals legislation). If this thesis has merit, its extension 
into indecency laws would be even stronger, as indecency, unlike obscenity, is 
constitutionally protected.  See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 462 
(2d Cir. 2007) (noting “that all speech covered by the FCC’s indecency policy is fully 
protected by the First Amendment”). 
 145. Supra discussion in Part III.C. 
 146. Supra discussion in Part IV. 
 147. Infra discussion in Part IV.D.1. 
 148. Infra discussion in Part V.A–B. 
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or insufficient reasoning.149  At the time the court heard the case, the 
FCC had already reconsidered both Billboard Music Awards issues on 
remand, reaffirming the fleeting expletive policy announced in the 
Golden Globes decision and, again, concluding that the material was 
actionably indecent.150  Having notice that its policy would be 
immediately subject to judicial review, the FCC went to great lengths 
in their remand opinion to provide an explanation for its policy 
change.151 
The situation is thus unlike one in which an agency either failed to 
provide an explanation or made no effort to adequately support its 
change in policy.152  The court’s opinion makes broad, conclusory 
statements to the effect that the FCC offered no support for its 
decision.153  In truth, however, the FCC offered many reasonable 
explanations for the policy154 and the court simply refused to accept 
them.  At the very least, the FCC met the burden of showing that the 
new rule effectuates the indecency statute as well as the old rule.155  It 
is curious, then, that the court also anticipated that the Commission 
would do nothing more on remand than develop a more adequate 
                                                 
 149. E.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
43 (1983); JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 68, at 184–85.   
 150. See Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2, 
2002 and Mar. 8, 2005 (Golden Globes Remand Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13305, 13325 
(2006), vacated by Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 151. Golden Globes Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 13301–28.  The FCC went so far as 
to justify their general authority to implement a regulatory scheme against 
constitutional attack.  Id. at 13317–21.  This treatment surely should be seen as a 
reasoned analysis, as their authority and policy is currently valid under Pacifica, and 
will remain so until a court finds that they have overstepped their First Amendment 
bounds.  See infra discussion in Part V.  Under the current law, however, no such 
lengthy explanation was even needed as an agency is free to modify policies at their 
discretion within the bounds of their authority which has not changed since Pacifica.  
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978) (“We have not decided that an 
occasional expletive . . . would justify a sanction . . . [because] [t]he Commission’s 
decision rested entirely on a nuisance rationale under which context is all-
important.”). 
 152. See Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (Act I), 852 F.2d 1332, 1341 (D.C. 
Cir. 1988) (criticizing the FCC for “ventur[ing] no explanation” why it considered 
children aged 12–17 the relevant group in need of protection from indecent 
content), overruled in part by Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (Act III), 58 F.3d 
654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
 153. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 460 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(labeling the FCC’s prediction of a future increase in expletives without regulation 
“divorced from reality”). 
 154. E.g., Golden Globes Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 13308 (explaining that 
“categorically requiring repeated use of expletives . . . is inconsistent with . . . the 
critical nature of context”). 
 155. See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 457 (referencing the standard announced in 
N.Y. Council, Ass’n of Civilian Technicians v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 757 F.2d 502, 
508 (2d Cir. 1985)). 
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explanation.156  Considering that the Commission convincingly tied 
the policy change to essentially every available justification for 
broadcast indecency regulation, one is left to wonder what, if any, 
reasoned analysis it could have offered that would have been 
satisfactory to the court. 
Finally, one of the major arguments against overly searching 
judicial review of agency decisions is that it forces agencies to devote 
greater resources to defending their policy changes in advance.157  
The effect of the Fox Television decision was to vacate and remand an 
already-remanded and extensively supported policy change for yet 
another round of rationalization.158  Further, the decision left both 
the FCC and broadcasters unsure of exactly what policy the FCC 
would or could implement with regard to fleeting expletives.159  This 
is particularly true because the FCC is still being urged by Congress to 
continue sanctioning fleeting expletives, while the Second Circuit is 
requiring additional, yet unspecified justifications for them to do 
so.160 
2. The FCC’s policy was supported by Congress and consistent with current 
law 
The FCC, in modifying its policy, was acting pursuant to the 
express wishes of Congress, which issued resolutions urging the 
continuance of the heightened fleeting expletive policy.161  However, 
                                                 
 156. See id. at 462 (predicting that on remand the FCC would provide a reasoned 
explanation for the change in policy, but suggesting that such an explanation would 
not pass “constitutional muster”). 
 157. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 
41 DUKE L. J. 1385, 1412 (1992)(discussing scholars’ claims that judicial review causes 
agencies to go to considerable lengths to create rulemaking records that respond to 
all conceivable objections). 
 158. See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 462 (remanding the issue to the FCC for 
reconsideration). 
 159. See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 401–03 
(4th ed. 2004) (criticizing the private and agency uncertainty that results from overly-
searching judicial review of agency action with no clear guidance on what would cure 
the defect). 
 160. This arguably leaves broadcasters less certain of what they may permissibly air 
than before the decision was handed down, and thus solves very little. Compare Press 
Release, FCC, Commissioner Copps Disappointed in Court Decision on Indecency 
Complaints (June 4, 2002), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attach 
match/DOC-273599A1.pdf (responding to Fox Television by suggesting that “any 
broadcaster who sees this decision as a green light to send more gratuitous sex and 
violence into our homes would be making a huge mistake”), with Stephen Labaton, 
Court Rebuffs FCC on Fines for Indecency, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/05/business/media/05decency.html?hp (noting 
industry speculation that the Fox Television court’s decision could “gut the ability of 
the commission to regulate any speech on television or radio”). 
 161. See H.R. Res. 500, 108th Cong. (2004) (“Expressing the sense of the House of 
Representatives that the Federal Communications Commission should vigorously 
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because the FCC did not cite congressional support as a specific 
justification for the change in policy, it could not be directly 
considered as part of the agency’s reasoning behind the policy 
change.162  Nevertheless, congressional support for the change is a 
strong argument that should at least have been supportive of the 
Commission’s decision.163 
Additionally, one of the factors relevant under arbitrary and 
capricious review is whether the agency has “relied on factors which 
Congress has not intended it to consider.”164  It should have 
counseled the court to some measure that both houses of Congress 
had issued resolutions urging the FCC to continue its policy of 
sanctioning indecent speech.165  It can hardly be arbitrary and 
capricious agency action when an agency acts pursuant to the 
demands of Congress, even when those demands are not formally 
adopted as law.166  Indeed, slightly over one month after the Fox 
                                                 
enforce indecency and profanity laws pursuant to the intent of Congress . . . .”); S. 
Res. 283, 108th Cong. (2003) (“Affirming the need to protect children in the United 
States from indecent programming.”).  Although enacted after the FCC’s decisions 
in the Billboard Music Awards incidents at issue in Fox Television, the Broadcast 
Decency Enforcement Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–235, 120 Stat. 491 (2006), raised 
the maximum fine for indecency violations from $10,000 per violation with a 
maximum of $75,000 to $325,000 for each violation with a maximum of $3,000,000 
for any “single act or failure to act”).  
 162. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm. Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983) (“The reviewing court should not attempt itself to make up for such 
deficiencies; we may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the 
agency itself has not given.” (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 
(1947))). 
 163. The major arguments against increased enforcement and regulation of 
broadcast focus on the means by which the government’s interest in protecting 
children is effectuated—namely that parents, rather than the FCC should be 
responsible for the broadcast content to which their children are exposed.  See, e.g., 
Terasa Chidester, What the #$ Is Happening on Television?  Indecency In Broadcasting, 13 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 135, 162 (2004) (summarizing arguments in favor of 
increased parental responsibility and decreased regulation).  Given that the Supreme 
Court has not revisited Pacifica, however, increased FCC regulation has not yet been 
ruled out as the least restrictive, narrowly tailored means of achieving that goal.  Id. 
at 163.  Therefore, the FCC is currently entitled to assume the constitutionality of the 
urgings of Congress.  See Erik Forde Ugland, Cable Television, New Technologies and the 
First Amendment After Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 60 MO. L. REV. 799, 
817–18 n.123 (1995) (“Because Congress has already spelled out the interests that 
justify its supervision of the broadcasting industry, and because the Supreme Court 
has already upheld the constitutionality of that system, individual regulations are, in 
effect, presumptively constitutional.”). 
 164. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. 
 165. E.g., H.R. Res. 500, 108th Cong. (2004); S. Res. 283, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 166. Congressional acquiescence to an agency interpretation can create a 
presumption in favor of the interpretation.  See Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. 
Comm’n of City of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 621 (1983)(“A contemporaneous and 
consistent construction of a statute by those charged with its enforcement combined 
with congressional acquiescence creates a presumption in favor of the administrative 
interpretation, to which we should give great weight.” (citing Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 
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Television court issued its decision, a bill was introduced in Congress 
to explicitly overrule the court’s decision.167  This bill would amend 
the FCC’s statutory authority to include a provision that a single word 
or image may constitute indecent programming.168  Considering 
recent congressional willingness to dramatically increase the amount 
a broadcaster may be fined for indecency,169 it is likely that the new 
bill will pass.170  If the bill does become law, the only potential ground 
for attacking the FCC’s enforcement of the fleeting expletive policy 
will be a constitutional one.171 
Nevertheless, as the law currently stands, the FCC’s indecency 
policy is constitutional, and the fleeting expletive policy did not 
change that fact.172  Although the Pacifica Court did not directly 
approve sanctions for fleeting expletives, it also did not expressly 
foreclose the possibility.173  Instead, the Court approved a contextual 
approach for determining when the “pig has entered the parlor,”174 
which is consistent with the FCC’s approach to fleeting expletives.175  
                                                 
287 U.S. 341, 345 (1932))).  Here the argument is even stronger because Congress 
did not acquiesce to the FCC’s interpretation, but rather, proactively supported it. 
 167. Protecting Children from Indecent Programming Act, S. 1780, 110th Cong. 
(2007). 
 168. Id.  The text of the amendment would read:  “In administering the 
regulations promulgated under subsection (a), the Commission shall maintain a 
policy that a single word or image may constitute indecent programming.”  Id. 
 169. See Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–235, 120 
Stat. 491 (2006) (increasing maximum fines for indecency, obscenity and profanity 
violations). 
 170. But see Krotoszynski, supra note 8, at 2119 (“If the Commission regularly 
attempted to assess fines and forfeitures sufficient to deter undesirable conduct by 
licensees, the commercial broadcasting community’s congressional allies would 
undoubtedly come to the industry’s rescue.”). 
 171. See Sophia Cope, Bill Could Hasten Demise of FCC Indecency Regulation, Center 
For Democracy & Technology, July 17, 2007,  http://blog.cdt.org/2007/07/17/bill-
could-hasten-demise-of-fcc-indecency-regulation/ (discussing the implications of the 
Protecting Children from Indecent Programming Act and concluding that, if passed, 
it would necessitate a constitutional evaluation of regulation of fleeting expletives). 
 172. See infra discussion in Part V. 
 173. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978) (comparing Carlin 
monologue to a “two-way radio conversation between a cab driver and a dispatcher, 
or a telecast of an Elizabethan comedy” and cautioning that the Court had not 
decided that “an occasional expletive in either setting would justify any sanction”). 
 174. Id. (analogizing to the law of nuisance to the extent that the contextual 
approach can simply mean the “‘right thing in the wrong place’” (quoting Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926))). 
 175. Despite a presumption that certain words are sexual or excretory references 
(which places them within the first prong of indecency analysis), the FCC’s test is still 
contextual with respect to whether the words are patently offensive under 
contemporary community standards.  See Complaints Regarding Various Television 
Broadcasts Between Feb. 2, 2002 and Mar. 8, 2005 (Omnibus Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 2664, 
2668 (2006) (describing indecency analysis as a balancing test and “contextual 
analysis”), modified by Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between 
Feb. 2, 2002 and Mar. 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299 (2006).  The effect of the policy 
change is merely that lack of repetition is no longer a dispositive factor in the 
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Making single utterances of expletives actionable is also consistent 
with the theories behind Pacifica.  Most notably, fining fleeting 
expletives is consistent with the “first blow” theory advanced by the 
Pacifica Court,176 and thus, unless Pacifica is revisited, the FCC’s 
contextual approach will remain constitutional. 
E. Summary of Arbitrary & Capricious Review 
The essential error of the Fox Television court was that it failed to 
give deference to the FCC’s interpretation of its mandate, and 
cloaked an attack on the FCC’s entire indecency regime in a non-
deferential critique of the agency’s reasoning.177  Although the court 
gave lip service to due deference,178 the decision is more 
appropriately viewed as a court disagreeing with an agency 
determination on an arguable interpretation of the governing 
statute,179 something both Chevron180 and Motor Vehicle Manufacturers 
Association of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co.181 condemn.  Although there was nothing actually 
impermissible about the way the Fox Television court decided the case, 
the court went to great lengths to find an inadequate explanation for 
the FCC’s change of policy, which approached the outer limits of 
judicial ability to discount deference to an agency’s policy 
determinations.182  As demonstrated by this analysis, the court’s 
extension of its power of review was a result of finding problems not 
                                                 
determination of patent offensiveness under contemporary community standards for 
the broadcast medium.  See id. at 13309 (reiterating that “‘even relatively fleeting 
references may be found indecent’ if the context makes them patently offensive” 
(quoting Industry Guidance on Commission’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C.          
§ 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency (2001 Enforcement 
Policies), 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, 8009 (2001))). 
 176. See supra discussion in Part IV.A.  
 177. See supra discussion in Part IV.  
 178. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 456 (2007) (“An initial 
agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone.” (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984))) (internal quotation 
omitted). 
 179. See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 473 (Leval, J., dissenting) (“What we have is at 
most a difference of opinion between a court and an agency . . . in matters within the 
agency’s competence . . . .”). 
 180. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (arguing that politically unaccountable federal 
judges have a duty to defer to the judgments of agencies in which Congress delegates 
responsibility for policy decisions). 
 181. Motor Vehicle Manuf. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
43 (1983) (cautioning courts not to substitute their judgment for that of the 
agencies’ under arbitrary and capricious review). 
 182. See supra discussion in Part III.A (reviewing the debate over the proper level 
of deference in judicial review). 
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with the change in policy, but with the justifications for broadcast 
regulation generally. 
V. THE FOX TELEVISION COURT’S CONSTITUTIONAL DICTA 
After holding that the FCC’s fleeting expletive policy was arbitrary 
and capricious, the Fox Television court predicted that the “fleeting 
expletive regime” would not withstand constitutional scrutiny because 
of concerns of vagueness, overbreadth and the erosion of 
justifications for broadcast’s unique First Amendment treatment.183  
This prediction was inaccurate because, much like the court’s 
arbitrariness analysis, it focused on problems applicable to indecency 
regulation generally and not to constitutional issues specific to the 
fleeting expletive policy.184  Nevertheless, the court’s prediction gave 
the first major show of support to many of the arguments made by 
broadcasters and commentators as to why the broadcast regulatory 
regime as a whole is unconstitutional,185 but failed to convincingly 
argue that the change in policy was even a part of the reason for its 
unconstitutionality.186  The court’s essential arguments concerning 
vagueness, overbreadth, technological advances and spectrum 
scarcity will be discussed in turn. 
                                                 
 183. See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 462–68.  The court addressed the constitutional 
issues only after suggesting that the FCC would be capable of adequately justifying its 
new stance on remand and that it would therefore continue to implement the policy.  
See id. at 462.  It is questionable that the FCC could provide an explanation sufficient 
for the Fox Television court considering the extremely high level of review and the 
already extensive justification proffered by the Commission.  See discussion supra 
Parts III–IV. 
 184. See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 463 (illustrating vagueness and over breadth 
with reference to FCC decisions).  All of the FCC decisions cited by the court, 
however, involved the use of multiple expletives, and so, would have been actionable 
even before the Golden Globes change.  See id. (discussing the airing of numerous 
expletives during the movie Saving Private Ryan as not indecent, while repeated 
expletives during a different broadcast were indecent); see also Complaints Regarding 
Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2, 2002 and Mar. 8, 2005 (Golden Globes 
Remand Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13307–08 (2006) (finding that Nicole Richie’s use 
of two expletives during the 2003 Billboard Music Awards qualified as repeated and 
deliberate), vacated by Fox Television, 489 F.3d 444. 
 185. See Robert Corn-Revere, Ronald G. London & Amber Husbands, Second 
Circuit Rejects FCC’s “Fleeting Expletives” Policy; Questions Indecency Regime 
(June 2007), http://www.dwt.com/practc/communications/bulletins/06-07_Indec 
ency.htm (suggesting that the Fox Television decision “called into serious question the 
ongoing constitutionality of the FCC’s enforcement regime as presently 
formulated”). 
 186. See infra discussion in Parts V.A and V.B (dissecting the court’s constitutional 
analysis and its focus on vagueness of definition and developments in technology 
rather than policy change). 
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A. Vagueness & Overbreadth 
The court’s primary constitutional concern was that the indecency 
definition is unconstitutionally vague in that it “fails to provide the 
clarity required by the Constitution” and overly broad because it 
“creates an undue chilling effect on free speech and requires 
broadcasters to ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone’” by censoring 
legitimate, protected speech.187  This argument has been made 
extensively by commentators188 and has validity when applied to the 
context-based approach generally.189  However, it is less applicable to 
fleeting expletives because specifically delineating certain words as 
actionable more closely approaches the “narrow specificity”190 
required in First Amendment regulation of speech. 
Many critics of the indecency standard argue that it is a vague and 
overly broad regulation that leads to unnecessary self-censorship 
beyond the proscribed speech.191  This argument is not novel, and was 
actually dismissed by the Pacifica Court when it noted that “[t]here 
are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less 
offensive language.”192  Moreover, given that the First Amendment 
seeks to protect the exchange of ideas by exposing them to public 
scrutiny,193 it seems logical that the most legitimate use of expletives 
would be for the purpose of discussing and exposing their taboo 
place in society.  This examination of expletives as expletives is exactly 
                                                 
 187. Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 463 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 
(1958)). 
 188. See, e.g., Bungard, supra note 20, at 194 (labeling the indecency standard an 
“applause test” and contending that the current test can be salvaged if consistently 
applied); Coates, supra note 19, at 789–97 (arguing that the FCC’s indecency test is 
vague and leads to broadcaster self-censorship); Nason Shefterl-Gomes, Your 
Revolution:  The Federal Communications Commission, Obscenity and the Chilling of Artistic 
Expression on Radio Airwaves, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 191, 212–14 (2006) 
(discussing broadcasters broad preventative self-censorship in response to lack of 
guidance). 
 189. But see Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 
1995) (suggesting that, although the FCC’s policy may cause self-censorship, 
broadcasters have the remedy of getting a “trial on the merits” of specific forfeitures 
in federal court and have thus far been unable to show that “the agency is forcing off 
the air material that is not indecent”); Danoff, supra note 129, at 780 (predicting that 
the Court will continue to rely on Pacifica’s emphasis on case-by-case determinations 
of indecency in order to overcome vagueness challenges). 
 190. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). 
 191. See, e.g., Rooder, supra note 31, at 898–902 (suggesting that the over-breadth 
of the indecency test coupled with increased fines leads to self-censorship). 
 192. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 n.18 (1978) (responding to 
broadcaster’s arguments that the FCC’s indecency definition “may lead some 
broadcasters to censor themselves”).    
 193. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 753 
(2d ed. 1997). 
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what George Carlin attempted to do in his monologue194 and exactly 
what the Pacifica court held may legitimately be censored.195  Thus, 
the Court has implicitly decided that the use of expletives—even as 
political commentary on expletives—may not be worthy of extensive 
First Amendment protection.196 
It also must be remembered that self-censorship is at the heart of 
the Pacifica doctrine,197 and that the Court has thus far been willing to 
tolerate censorship that lies at “the periphery of First Amendment 
concern.”198  The language at issue in the fleeting expletives cases is 
exactly the type of language to which the Court was referring199 
because, in the Court’s words, avoiding indecent language “will have 
its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious 
communication.”200  Therefore, although the indecency test may be 
problematic with respect to more complex determinations, when it 
comes to merely offensive language—a concept simple to grasp but 
difficult to define—a policy allowing fines for single expletives 
reduces constitutional problems with vagueness and overbreadth 
because broadcasters are on explicit notice that any use of certain 
words may be indecent.201 
Once the assumption is made that certain words are presumptively 
indecent, broadcasters need only decide if the word is nevertheless 
justified as “demonstrably essential to the nature of an artistic or 
educational work or essential to informing viewers on a matter of 
public importance.”202  Although this is by no means a black and 
                                                 
 194. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 730 (noting that Carlin, as a social satirist, was seeking 
to use “words to satirize as harmless and essentially silly our attitudes towards those 
words”). 
 195. See id. at 750–51 (holding that the FCC’s power to regulate does not require a 
finding of obscenity). 
 196. See id. at 747 (reasoning that the social value of speech varies with the 
circumstances). 
 197. Because the FCC cannot prohibit indecent language before it airs—which 
would be a prior restraint—it relies exclusively on deterrence through the threat of 
fines to deliberately induce self-censorship.  See id. at 736 (noting that the FCC may 
not subject “broadcast matter to scrutiny prior to its release”). 
 198. Id. at 743. 
 199. See id. at 746 (“‘Such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of 
ideas and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be 
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality.’” (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942))). 
 200. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 744 n.18. 
 201. See Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing 
of the “Golden Globe Awards” Program (Golden Globes Complaint), 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 
4978 (2004) (placing broadcasters on notice that any variation of the “F-Word” is 
inherently sexual thus meeting the first prong of the indecency definition as 
describing or depicting sexual or excretory activities). 
 202. Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2, 2002 
and Mar. 8, 2005 (Omnibus Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 2664, 2669 (2006) (discussing 
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white determination,203 it is no more vague than contextually 
evaluating other forms of potential indecency to determine if they 
are patently offensive.204  Moreover, the Commission’s decisions 
provide a reasonably good sense of the situations in which the artistic 
or educational exceptions will apply.205  Thus, the determination that 
fleeting expletives are actionable does nothing to exacerbate the 
inherent vagueness and overbreadth of the FCC’s general context-
based approach, and instead, places all potentially indecent speech 
on the same level.206  In short, although vagueness and overbreadth 
                                                 
exceptions to the presumption that the “S-word” and “F-word” are profane), modified 
by Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2, 2002 and 
Mar. 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299 (2006).  The same exceptions also militate against a 
finding of indecency because they suggest that the word is not patently offensive 
under contemporary standards for the broadcast medium.  See id. (explaining why 
expletives in broadcast of Saving Private Ryan were not considered indecent or 
profane).  Admittedly the argument could be made that, while the presumption 
reduces vagueness, over-breadth remains because broadcasters might not air words 
that would actually have been acceptable in the circumstances. 
 203. It seems probable that the more fleeting the expletive, the less likely that it 
will be integral to any artistic message because single expletives are more shocking 
than those repeated at length.  See Omnibus Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 2691 (finding Cher’s 
use of the “F-word” in the Golden Globes to be “shocking and gratuitous” and 
implying that the word could have been blocked (i.e. bleeped) “without 
disproportionately disrupting the speaker’s message”). 
 204. The only additional chilling effect that could possibly result from this 
determination with regard to fleeting expletives would be that a broadcaster chooses 
not to air a specific word because of concern about whether the contextual 
exceptions would apply.  As noted, any such errors would result in only the single, 
potentially offensive word being censored which almost certainly “lie[s] at the 
periphery of First Amendment concern.”  Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 730.  But see Katherine 
A. Fallow, The Big Chill, Congress and the FCC Crack Down on Indecency, 22 COMM. LAW. 
1, 29 (2004) (predicting, in reference to the fleeting expletive policy, that “the 
uncertainty surrounding the FCC’s standard will almost certainly deter broadcasters 
from airing programs containing any of the ‘seven dirty words,’ even if they form an 
integral part of important political, social, or artistic speech”).  The weakness of this 
prediction lies in its assumption that broadcasters would choose not airing the entire 
program over bleeping a single word. 
 205. Compare Omnibus Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 2687–90 (finding multiple variations of 
the word “shit” to be indecent in the broadcast of a fictional account of a 1971 
skyjacker), with Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2, 
2002 and Mar. 8, 2005 (Golden Globes Remand Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13326–28 
(2006) (finding that interviewee’s use of “bullshitter” on the Today Show was not 
indecent because it occurred during a news interview), vacated by Fox Television 
Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007).  But see Fallow, supra note 204, at 
28–29 (examining FCC indecency decisions and noting problems in applying the 
FCC’s contextual test and confusion over where the line should be drawn). 
 206. Although it is conceivable that situations could arise where broadcasters 
censor material that ultimately would have been appropriate in context, such 
speculation is not likely grounds for overturning a regulation.  See Hill v. Colorado, 
530 U.S. 703, 733 (2000) (“Speculation about possible vagueness in hypothetical 
situations not before the Court will not support a facial attack on a statute when it is 
surely valid ‘in the vast majority of its intended applications.’” (citing United States v. 
Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 23 (1960))). 
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are problems, they are not problems stemming from sanctioning 
fleeting expletives. 
B. Changes in Technology, Erosion of Uniqueness, and  
Less Restrictive Means 
The second major constitutional argument advanced by the Fox 
Television court was that, due to increasing prevalence of cable, 
satellite, Internet and other media, broadcast is no longer unique207 
and therefore its regulations deserve the same First Amendment 
scrutiny208 as restrictions on non-broadcast media.209  This argument is 
essentially a critique of the scarcity rationale that still underlies all 
broadcast regulation—the idea that broadcast may be regulated 
because there are more people who want to broadcast than there are 
available frequencies.210  Although this is a potentially valid 
argument,211 it is causally unrelated to fleeting expletives and is 
                                                 
 207. See, e.g., Chidester, supra note 163, at 166 (suggesting that “[t]he fact that so 
many Americans have access to cable” makes “maintenance of two different 
standards . . . outdated”); Rooder, supra note 31, at 895–97 (summarizing arguments 
that broadcast is no longer “readily distinguishable from other media on the grounds 
of pervasiveness”). 
 208. The Fox Television court did not explicitly call for strict scrutiny in broadcast 
speech restrictions, but, according to industry lawyers, intimated that “strict scrutiny 
may soon apply to broadcasting.”  See Robert Corn-Revere, Ronald G. London & 
Amber Husbands, Second Circuit Rejects FCC’s “Fleeting Expletives” Policy; 
Questions Indecency Regime (June 2007), http://www.dwt.com/practc/communi 
cations/bulletins/06-07_Indecency.htm. 
 209. See Fox Television, 489 U.S. at 464–65 (commenting that, although the media 
landscape has changed, broadcast has historically had and continues to have less First 
Amendment protection); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637 
(1994) (holding that the rationales for applying less rigorous scrutiny to broadcast 
do not apply to cable); cf. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (applying strict 
scrutiny to Internet regulations). 
 210. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969) (allowing the 
government to regulate broadcast licenses in order to facilitate communication by 
preventing overcrowding of broadcast spectrum).  Scholars and broadcasters have 
debated the validity of the scarcity rationale since its inception and current 
technological changes are fueling the debate.  See, e.g., Josephine Soriano, Note, The 
Digital Transition and The First Amendment:  Is It Time To Reevaluate Red Lion’s Scarcity 
Rationale, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 341, 355–56 (2006) (surveying the scarcity rationale 
and suggesting that “the time is ripe” for it to be reconsidered); Varona, supra note 
10, at 57–64 (discussing the continuing validity of the scarcity rationale for broadcast 
regulation). 
 211. See Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 
1995) (Edwards, C.J., concurring) (suggesting that indecency regulation law is in a 
“state of disarray” and questioning the distinction between broadcast and cable 
television given cable’s responsibility for a significant amount of indecency on 
television).  But see Varona, supra note 9, at 167 (discussing the scarcity rationale and 
arguing that “new technologies have done nothing to lessen the persistent scarcity in 
broadcast frequencies available for license”). 
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equally applicable to the FCC’s policy before single words became 
actionable.212 
The court also argued that targeted blocking technology such as 
the V-Chip213 is a less restrictive means, as compared to FCC 
regulation of protecting children.214  The court thus suggested that 
the Commission’s active regulatory role may no longer be narrowly 
tailored to achieve the government’s goals of protecting children.215  
This argument has also been extensively studied by scholars and has 
significant merit.216  The trouble with these arguments, however, is 
that they posit less restrictive means (e.g. the V-Chip) for achieving 
the government’s objectives only after building on the erosion of 
uniqueness and scarcity to heighten the level of scrutiny.217  
Therefore, in order for the Court to accept the targeted blocking 
argument, it would have to first dispense with or dilute both the 
scarcity rationale and Pacifica’s articulation of the uniqueness of 
broadcast so that FCC regulations could be analyzed under 
heightened scrutiny.  When viewed in this light, the Fox Television 
court’s argument goes too far for its purpose and could theoretically 
                                                 
 212. The arguments regarding uniqueness and scarcity go toward the FCC’s ability 
to regulate broadcast rather than the specific regulations imposed under that 
authority.  See Sophia Cope, Center For Democracy & Technology, Bill Could Hasten 
Demise of FCC Indecency Regulation (July 17, 2007), http://blog.cdt.org/2007/ 
07/17/bill-could-hasten-demise-of-fcc-indecency-regulation/ (“[T]he time is coming 
when the constitutional question will not be ‘to what degree may the FCC regulate 
indecent speech?’ but rather, ‘can the FCC regulate indecent speech at all?’”).  The 
Fox Television court’s technology and scarcity dicta lean toward the latter, while the 
issue of fleeting expletives is clearly the former. 
 213. See Federal Communications Commission, V-Chip:  Viewing Television 
Responsibly, http://www.fcc.gov/vchip/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2007) (explaining that 
the V-Chip, in combination with program ratings, “permit[s] parents to block 
programming with a certain rating from coming into their home”).  The V-Chip 
became mandatory in all televisions over thirteen inches manufactured after Jan. 1, 
2000.  Id. 
 214. See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 464 (comparing recent Supreme Court cases 
striking down cable and Internet speech regulations because less restrictive means 
(i.e., targeted blocking) were available to protect children). 
 215. See id. (contrasting scrutiny of restrictions inside and outside of the context of 
broadcast media). 
 216. See Rooder, supra note 31, at 874–81 (discussing First Amendment standards 
for indecency applied to non-broadcast media such as telephone, cable television 
and the internet and finding that less restrictive means made restrictions on speech 
outside of broadcast unconstitutional); Joshua B. Gordon, Note, Pacifica Is Dead.  
Long Live Pacifica:  Formulating a New Argument Structure to Preserve Government 
Regulation of Indecent Broadcasts, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1451, 1480–83 (2006) (detailing 
technological attacks on Pacifica’s uniqueness rationales and concluding that cable 
and broadcast are indistinguishable in First Amendment terms and that V-chip 
technology is a less restrictive alternative to content regulation). 
 217. See generally Chidester, supra note 163, at 158–66 (discussing the merits of 
technological advances and increased regulation as ways to curb indecent material in 
broadcast). 
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strip the government of its long-standing justifications for regulating 
broadcast in any capacity.218  This would be an immensely 
disproportionate step taken to protect occasional fleeting expletives 
under the First Amendment. 
Furthermore, the technology as less restrictive means argument is 
currently less applicable to fleeting expletives than to other forms of 
indecency because the V-Chip technology relies on program ratings 
that may or may not take expletives into account.219  Thus, while a V-
Chip may be able to accurately screen for programs with excessive 
sexual content, its effectiveness is limited with respect to fleeting and 
often unpredictable expletives.220  Although an argument could be 
made that targeted blocking is a less restrictive means of protecting 
children from, for example, violent content, technology has not 
progressed to the point where parents can selectively block indecent 
language.221 
Therefore, the only currently effective place in the broadcast 
stream to intercept fleeting expletives is before they air and a 
relatively short delay in live broadcasts can essentially guarantee that 
                                                 
 218. Once the scarcity and uniqueness arguments are set aside, the only basis 
arguably left for regulating broadcast is pervasiveness, which, would be a difficult 
argument to make in the face of the increasing pervasiveness of cable, satellite and 
Internet.  See, e.g., Danoff, supra note 129, at 781 (distinguishing between the 
pervasiveness of the medium and the programming and claiming that pervasiveness 
of programming is a “powerful” argument for “extending Pacifica to cable and 
satellite radio”). 
 219. See Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2, 
2002 and Mar. 8, 2005 (Golden Globes Remand Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13319–20 
(2006) (noting that the V-chip depends on program ratings which are often 
inaccurate and observing that most televisions do not have a V-chip and parents do 
not know how to use them), vacated by Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 444.  See generally 
Adam Thierer, Why Regulate Broadcast?  Toward a Consistent First Amendment Standard 
For the Information Age, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 431, 472–73 (2007) (explaining the 
V-chip and claiming that the low usage rates should not be used as an “excuse for 
government regulation of television programming”). 
 220. See Golden Globes Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 13319–20. 
 221. But see Thierer, supra note 219, at 473–82 (surveying technological, 
educational and lobbying alternatives to FCC broadcast regulation and concluding 
that regulation is no longer justified in light of these workable, but imperfect, 
alternatives); Gordon, supra note 216, at 1480–83 (positing that technology such as 
the V-chip and rating systems are a less restrictive alternative for protecting children 
from indecency at the household level rather than by government regulation).  It is 
likely, however, that in the near future blocking technology will progress to the point 
where it does become a less restrictive means of protecting children from indecent 
speech.  See, e.g., TVGuardian, The Foul Language Filter Homepage, http://tvguard 
ian.com/gshell.php (last visited Nov. 18, 2007) (exclaiming that “TVGuardian is a 
patented, award winning technology that automatically mutes offensive language”).  
This could conceivably give the Court all it needs to strike down or reduce the FCC’s 
regulatory role without actually abandoning the justifications for reduced scrutiny. 
 2008] ARBITRARY AND F^@#S*! CAPRICIOUS 759 
expletives do not slip by in inappropriate circumstances.222  Given that 
there is still a general consensus that the goal of protecting children 
from indecent speech is valid,223 placing the responsibility for content 
control in broadcasters still represents the least restrictive method of 
accomplishing this objective.224  In sum, fining broadcasters for 
fleeting expletives does not contribute anything to the validity of the 
arguments that broadcast is no longer unique or scarce and fleeting 
expletives are currently not controllable by less restrictive means than 
FCC regulation. 
CONCLUSION 
Beginning in 1978 with FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the FCC has 
been a gatekeeper of sorts for the content of broadcast media.225  
What began as the regulation of a “verbal shock treatment”226 of 
expletives by a comedian has resulted in the FCC taking responsibility 
for policing speech on the airwaves within the bounds of the First 
Amendment.227  There are many increasingly viable arguments, 
however, that Pacifica’s justifications for the permissibility of 
broadcast censorship are no longer valid.  In that context, a pitched 
battle is brewing between the FCC and broadcasters who assert that 
regulation of broadcast is no longer justifiable.228 
Meanwhile, the FCC, with apparent support from Congress, has 
decided to once again expand its enforcement capacity, ruling that 
                                                 
 222. See Golden Globes Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 13311–14 (recognizing that 
bleeping expletives is not foolproof, but contending that a five second delay should 
be sufficient to stop unwanted expletives without changing the live quality of 
broadcast). But see Corn-Revere, supra note 17, at 265 (claiming that the 
government’s interest in “substituting itself for informed and empowered parents . . . 
is not sufficiently compelling” because it incorrectly assumes that parents are not 
capable or interested enough to monitor what their children are watching (quoting 
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 825 (2000))). 
 223. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (“[W]e have repeatedly 
recognized the governmental interest in protecting children from harmful 
materials.”); Rooder, supra note 31, at 903 (arguing that the Pacifica Court’s 
“‘protection of children’ rationale is still compelling”).  But see Danoff, supra note 
129, at 776–78 (2007) (claiming that concern for children’s exposure to 
objectionable broadcast content may be “overly-inflated,” but noting that it is still a 
“legitimate government interest”). 
 224. But see Corn-Revere, supra note 17, at 265 (implying that targeted blocking 
technology is the least restrictive means of achieving the government’s interest in 
protecting children). 
 225. See supra discussion in Part I. 
 226. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 756 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 227. See supra discussion in Part I. 
 228. See supra Part V and accompanying notes. 
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single or “fleeting” expletives are actionable indecency.229  The 
affected broadcasters challenged the policy and the Second Circuit 
agreed with them, finding it to be arbitrary and capricious under the 
Administrative Procedure Act.230 
Although the arbitrary and capricious standard is applied with a 
high degree of variability, the Fox Television court went too far and 
substituted its judgment for the FCC’s, and in doing so, attacked the 
entire justification behind broadcast regulation.231  Further, by 
remanding the issue to the FCC, the court only caused increased 
uncertainty for both the FCC and broadcasters about the proper 
scope of the FCC’s power to regulate broadcast speech.232 
The Fox Television court also predicted that the new policy was 
unconstitutional without finding that the fleeting expletive policy had 
in any way contributed to the unconstitutionality.233  Moreover, the 
court’s constitutional predictions, if carried to their logical 
conclusions, could mean the demise of the rationale behind all 
broadcast regulation for the minimal gain of protecting the low First 
Amendment priority of fleeting expletives.  Because the fleeting 
expletive policy is within the limits of the FCC’s authority under 
current law,234 it cannot be struck down on constitutional grounds 
unless the Supreme Court chooses to reevaluate Pacifica and the 
FCC’s broader authority to implement context-based speech 
restrictions.235 
Despite the many reasons why Pacifica may no longer be valid,236 
there are no compelling arguments as to why the airing of a single 
expletive should receive more First Amendment protection than the 
airing of several.  The first blow rationale advanced in Pacifica is just 
as, if not more, applicable to fleeting expletives than to repeated 
ones.237  Moreover, the battle over broadcast regulation should focus 
on more pressing and genuine concerns than whether a broadcaster 
may be fined because only a single expletive slipped by a bleeper who 
fell asleep at the wheel.  Therefore, if Fox Television is appealed, the 
                                                 
 229. See Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2, 
2002 and Mar. 8, 2005 (Golden Globes Remand Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13308 
(2006), vacated by Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 230. See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 462. 
 231. See supra discussion in Parts III–IV. 
 232. See supra discussion in Part IV. 
 233. See supra discussion in Part V. 
 234. But see Chidester, supra note 163, at 167 (arguing that “targeting certain 
words as indecent” is an unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech). 
 235. See supra discussion in Parts IV–V. 
 236. See supra discussion in Part V. 
 237. See supra discussion in Part IV.A. 
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Supreme Court should reverse the Second Circuit, find the fleeting 
expletive policy constitutional, and wait for a more legitimate context 
in which to reform the general indecency regulatory scheme.238 
 
                                                 
 238. Such a challenge seems most likely if technology could effectively and 
selectively block unwanted content.  Additionally, because the free and public nature 
of broadcast is one of the last remaining impediments to consistent regulatory 
treatment across media, the Internet, with its similarly high level of accessibility will 
probably represent the closest analogy once access to Internet connection reaches 
levels comparable to television access.  An interesting challenge could arise in a 
situation where an identical television show is broadcast on television and 
simultaneously streamed live over the Internet.  In theory, the Internet version could 
contain content presently deemed unacceptable for television, but with similar 
pervasiveness and accessibility by children. 
